Interestingly, the hackers of the AP government sites are of the old school kudos-seeking type, identifying themselves as “Bb0y” and “Hmei7″. Not all hacking is done for monetary gain or for the theft of information, but there exists a clear and present danger to vulnerable government infrastructure, which compromises national security. The presence of what appears to be Urdu script on the hacker’s calling-card image cannot escape notice since it raises questions about the possible nationality of the hackers. The timing of this hack is potentially interesting given the ongoing investigation into the recent incident in New Delhi involving an Israeli Defence Attaché’s spouse. Nation-to-nation conflicts were covered in a recent blog.

India has too many enemies or opportunistic malefactors beyond her borders and, indeed, within them. One can only hope that critical military, DRDO, ISRO, and key government (e.g. the Cabinet Ministries) IT infrastructure is very well secured. The rest of the central and state government institutions need to get their act together. It’s not rocket science.

Samir Mody
Senior Manager, K7TCL

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The malware authors have commented their part of the code in Latin. The malicious code uses a twitter API to get the trending topics of the day, and generates malicious domain names on the fly to which users will be finally redirected.

K7 Computing has informed the party in charge about the attack. K7 security products prevent access to this malicious URL.

Lokesh Kumar
K7 TCL

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Although time consuming and resource intensive, the malware author installs various Anti-Virus software and keeps them updated. The malicious files are scanned on this system before they are distributed to the victim.

For malware authors/script kiddies who can’t afford to build such a system, there are underground sites which mimic genuine online file/URL scanning services. A significant difference being, these underground sites in exchange for money, promise not to distribute the scanned files to the Anti-Virus vendors. Given below are screen shots of two such sites:

Then there are tools which incorporate multiple scanners & are distributed for free. Given below is a screen shot of one such tool:

If their malicious code is detected by the Anti-Virus vendors during the initial stage of the attack, the malware authors are quick to change their binary.

While traditional checksum based detections alone might be ineffective against such files, a combination of several detection methods, which include a behaviour based approach will prove far more effective.

R.V Shyam Charan
K7 TCL

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MIDI is an old-fashioned media file format which theoretically reduces the attack surface for the exploit since the use of these files is uncommon in the modern day. However, it might still be possible for an attacker to lure victims to a website or a document where an embedded malicious MIDI file is rendered automatically, triggering the vulnerability. We have not seen any reports of Exploit ( 700000031 ) in the wild thus far.

We, at K7TCL, will continue to focus on timely detection of high-risk exploits. It is important to target detection based on the risk factor since the incorporation of detection for exploit files can be non-trivial due to the fact that many exploit files, by their very nature, tend to have relatively obscure file formats. Heuristic detection of such files requires non-standard file parsing which entails possible consequences for scanning performance and stability, and, perforce, there is an increased risk of misdetections as well.

In terms of common “in the wild” threats the Carnivore feature in K7 products provides generic protection against active attempts to exploit several popular applications, such as certain browsers and document readers, not necessarily from Microsoft.

Exploitation of vulnerabilities, especially in standard Windows OS applications, is a clear and present danger which ought to be taken very seriously. To counter this threat, there is no substitute for applying the relevant security updates, and we strongly recommend that this is done on a regular basis. The provision of detection for exploits, whether via Carnivore or via real-time scanning, is seen simply as an additional safety net, and not as a substitute for applying patches. Note, K7 products also have the functionality to identify certain vulnerable applications extant on the computer so that the relevant Microsoft patch may be applied as appropriate.

Samir Mody
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A quick look at the source code for the page shows an encoded binary file embedded in a VBScript:

Visiting this site with a poorly configured Internet Explorer browser will lead to the above script being rendered. The encoded file in turn is decoded and a malicious file named svchost.exe is dropped onto the user’s computer and is executed.

The malicious executable is an infamous file infector named Win32.Ramnet and detection for this executable has been around for more than a year now. This seems to suggest that the machine hosting the website has either little or no security solution in place.

With the holiday season in full swing, online shoppers are requested not to let their guard down. While you may be on holiday, the miscreants aren’t.

K7 Security products don’t just detect and delete the malicious file, but also prevent access to the hacked site:

Lokesh Kumar
K7 TCL

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Continuing from the second instalment on last week’s blog…

In the Name of Mammon

The volume of malware samples up to 2006 and the 20 years prior to that could not have totalled more than a quarter of a million. Post 2006, however, the number of malware samples discovered year-on-year has multiplied manifold, with the current number of daily samples being in the order of tens of thousands. An estimate of the gross volume of malware samples since 2007 stands at well over 52.6 million.

The modern threat landscape is heavily dominated by malware written for financial gain, and since 2007 much of this malware is believed to originate in China and Russia (and the erstwhile republics of the Soviet Union), with those in South Korea and Brazil being smaller but significant players. It must be borne in mind that tracing malware back to its true origins is a difficult exercise since it is extremely straightforward for malware to pretend to come from another country, whether based on malware hosting URL or locales within the binary samples, etc.  However, a crude analysis of recent malware samples suggests that 20% come from China, 10% come from Russia, 3% may be attributed to Brazil, and 2% are Korean. These numbers are almost certainly gross underestimates. Suffice to state that the perception that the bulk of malware, much of it with a financial motive, comes from a handful of countries is a reasonable one. However, one ought to go further in an attempt to understand the potential reasons for this geographical bias in malware origin. Let us first digress briefly to explore the nature of some of the modern threats that have emanated from Asia.

Lineage of Modern Asian Malware

The spate of Autorun worms has already been described earlier. Many of these Autorun worm families did not have an obvious link to financial gain. The motive was to morph soon enough.

During the mid-to-late 2000s Asian malware was dominated by families of High Level Language Prepender file infectors and password stealers (PWS/PSW Trojans) which are believed to originate primarily in China. These PWS Trojans targeted online games such as Lineage and World of Warcraft, supposedly popular amongst Chinese gamers. Stolen game passwords and artefacts appear to have been sufficiently in demand to warrant a black market involving the exchange of hard currency.

In more recent years the Asian malware focus has expanded to encompass mundane Distributed Denial of Service and other hacker tools, Browser Helper Objects and browser hijackers, botnets with remote Command & Control, and rootkits. Interestingly, the increase in mobile threats, e.g. for the Android platform, is believed to be fuelled by authors in Russia and China.

Dave the Malware Author

Despite the Terminator series and other sci-fi films from Hollywood, code which control machines, whether it is good or nasty, is well and truly written by humans rather than automatons or some abstract force of evil. This fact raises interesting and important questions about malware authorship and the reasons for it. There is general agreement and plenty of statistics about the volume and sources of burgeoning malware, but perhaps an insufficiently clear understanding of and explanation for the phenomenon. Of course much of the malware is written for monetary gain, however, why then are the contributions to the threat landscape so heavily influenced by geography?

Dotcom Boom

Since 2007 the number of internet users in China and Russia has more than doubled to over 420 million (>31% of the population) and 59 million (>42% of the population) users respectively. This dramatic increase in a short timeframe implies a massive investment in internet infrastructure, both network connectivity and PC hardware, and a phenomenal increase in computer literacy.

Of course, these infrastructure improvements provide the means and viability for malware production since it is now increasingly possible to create and distribute malware globally, and reap the profits. Importantly, the increasing number of internet users also provides a growing local “market” for malware, i.e. there are now many more potential victims to exploit.

Internet penetration is increasing in other parts of Asia such as India and the “Tiger Cub” nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. It remains to be seen if the increase in the number of internet users in these countries leads to a concomitant rise in the number of malware emanating from them.

Legal Aid

Writing and distributing malware, essentially a form of common thievery in the modern day and potentially very damaging, is or ought to be against the law. Therefore there are likely to be legal aspects, with local flavours, to the geographical trend in malware.

The cyber crime laws in the so-called “malware hubs” are considered relatively lax or poorly enforced, due to various technical and administrative reasons . The process of strengthening cyber crime laws is certainly progressing, albeit at a viscous pace according to some. It is indeed surprising that even Japan, with its government departments dedicated to monitoring and fighting cyber crime [e.g. Office of IT Security Policy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry], has supposedly only just recently made malware writing illegal.

It is possible that many of the victims of modern malware have been in countries other than the alleged malware hubs. This leads to issues of international jurisdiction. Local law enforcement agencies in victim countries would struggle to prosecute overseas perpetrators, and the law enforcement agencies in possible malware hub countries may not have sufficient incentive to investigate cyber crime and prosecute offenders when the victims are outside their remit.

Reports on the arrests of cyber criminals in China and elsewhere in Asia have made the press and blogs. There have also been coordinated international law enforcement efforts to arrest and prosecute cyber criminals which have shown positive, albeit probably ephemeral, results . No doubt, there are still too many loopholes for malware writers to function with impunity, and a course correction, replete with international treaties, is warranted.

SOD’s Law?

Iniquitous growth, inadequate job and education opportunities and denial of basic human freedoms are leading to growing radicalization of the youth, intolerance and extremism.

We have no choice but to meet these challenges head-on.
-    Shree Manmohan Singh, Honourable Prime Minister of India, in his address to the UN General Assembly, 24th September 2011

Human greed has no nationality. However, the sheer scale of the migration towards following a dubious path in the malware hubs suggests possible institutional concerns. Inadequate overall legislation notwithstanding, one would assume there are other core reasons to forsake Confucian values. These core reasons constitute a “Seeds of Discontent” hypothesis.

Money, the universal means of exchange in economics, forms the rationale for malware creation and distribution, and, perforce, economics deals with the fundamentals of social welfare. Deficiencies in social welfare sow the seeds of discontent, sometimes tending to result in undesirable activities, including malware authorship, as there is a scramble to satisfy Maslow’s hierarchy of needs when resources are scarce. If indeed the core issues derive from economic indicators, then we ought to spend some time investigating them in laymen’s terms.

A few of the global malware hubs went through periods of extreme economic restructuring based on Freidmanesque rather than Keynesian principles throughout the 1990s [Naomi Klein, “The Shock Doctrine”]. The extent of the economic volte-face in a couple of cases was from chalk to cheese, or vice-versa depending on one’s perspective. It is alleged that one of the eventual key consequences of these economic restructuring programmes was the loss of jobs and livelihoods for large swathes of people.

Since the 1990s several instances of downturns in the globalised economy, including the “credit crunch” which began in 2008, could have piqued the general sense of consternation and despair. A marked increase in criminal activity, including the establishment of mafia gangs, may well have been a reaction to these unfortunate scenarios. High-tech criminal activity, in the form of cyber crime, comes to the fore when the perpetrators happen to be adept university graduates who are unable to find suitable employment in the legitimate IT sector.

Let us consider Russia, a Eurasian country, as a simple case study since candid information is freely available. Russia’s unemployment rate has averaged around 8.4% with a high of 14.6% in February, 1999. Unemployment, and possibly other social welfare, benefits are reportedly far better on paper than they are in reality, and Russia’s inflation rate, double-digit on average over recent years, can be considered high. Mr. Putin, Russia’s former president and a firm candidate to return to the Kremlin, envisages an increase of average wages and salaries by 50% to US $1,000 by 2014. An ambitious $1,000 in 3 years time fades, nay wilts, in comparison to a guaranteed monthly salary of $5,000 currently offered to write custom packers to wrap malware. Therefore the incentive for many young Russian graduates, especially those with an IT background, to contribute to the “malware industry” appears particularly strong.

It is a reasonable assumption that most people who are able to comfortably satisfy Maslow’s pyramid through legitimate means are unlikely to be tempted by malware writing, given the moral and legal implications. The corollary of this, however, would be that once a person has been “turned”, he/she might have crossed “the point of no return”, i.e. succumbed to the malaise. Nevertheless the emphasis ought to be on dissuading the next generations of youth from partaking in the malware industry. This will be no easy task given the economic policy changes that might be required under difficult globalised economic conditions.

One would wager an educated guess, indeed a lot more, that the current trend of financially motivated malware, in increasing numbers, out of Asia and elsewhere will continue unabated. The role of the IT security industry is to continue to protect customers against malware attacks, and the law enforcement agencies are expected to prosecute the perpetrators. However, for the longer term, it could be the global policy-makers who hold the key to attempt to resolve the underlying issues to stem the gushing flow of malware.

The End

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Samir Mody
Senior Manager, K7TCL

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Continuing from the first instalment on last week’s blog…

The Art of Cyber War

Nation-specific Attacks

Stuxnet, a worm with a particularly venomous, damaging payload, was almost certainly targeting the Iranian nuclear establishment. Given the means and the end, if one were to consider the motive, one would have no alternative but to attribute the creation of Stuxnet to powerful nations inimical to Iran’s nuclear programme, a couple of which are in West Asia.

The use of malware as an instrument of state policy may have already been in effect for a couple decades[Rainer Fahs, keynote address, EICAR2011]. In modern times nation-to-nation attacks, alleged or otherwise, have been given considerable publicity with much finger wagging and pointing. Many of these instances of cyber warfare appear to originate in Asia, which is hardly surprising given the frosty relationships that exist between several neighbourhood countries in Asia, e.g. North Korea-South Korea, India-Pakistan, etc. Indeed, avoiding the mention of China’s alleged contribution to cyber warfare would be like ignoring the elephant in the room, and the apparent involvement of Israeli personnel most certainly deserves an explicit mention.

There have been several documented cases of nation-specific cyber attacks, some of which are potentially ongoing. These cases may be summarised as follows:

The strategic advantage offered to powerful and resourceful nations via targeted cyber attacking is highly significant. As described in Table 2, the scope of these attacks could be anything from the stealing of state secrets to the targeted damage of both government hardware and software. Critical modern infrastructure is controlled by computer systems which presents an irresistible target for cyber attacks.

The stakes and incentives involved in cyber warfare are high, and cyber attacks are unlikely to diminish in the years to come. On the contrary, cyber warfare is likely to increase manifold with an eastward shift in the balance of power in the global hegemony suggesting an increasing involvement of Asian states.

There can be little doubt that the military and intelligence establishments of various nations have wings dedicated to cyber warfare. Sun Tzu would have been proud. Given the enormous resources involved and the high-profile, targeted nature of cyber attacks, it is difficult to predict the security responses of commercial Anti-Virus companies and the general public at large. It is likely that standard civilian bodies would be largely bystanders in these events. Indeed, for every attack that is reported and documented in the public domain, there may well be several others which are kept very firmly under wraps.

However, perhaps there are some mitigating circumstances:

1. As a diplomatic preventative measure, it is possible that there could be an international convention, perhaps UN-brokered, on cyber warfare. The US government has already been contemplating diplomatic talks with certain countries. The main issue herein could well be the difficulty in proving state versus non-state actors, a challenge even in conventional warfare where proxy militant groups have been used with impunity to perpetrate attacks across international boundaries.
2. Standard technical measures to secure systems, including instituting prescribed system configurations and policies, may be sufficient to prevent “80 percent of commonly known cyber attacks”.

Notwithstanding, it will be interesting to track how events transpire in the future. The average citizen of the world may well have to wait for the future offerings from Hollywood or Bollywood, with their vivid imaginations, to gauge the extent of the issues dealt with by sedentary agents code named ‘0000 0000 0111’, ‘JS0N B0URN3’, etc.

Corporate Insecurities

The attacks on large, well-known corporate entities over the recent past have been much publicised. The alleged origin of some of these high-profile, ongoing, attacks lie in Asia. It is worth summarising some of these attacks, described as “Advanced Persistent Threats”, as follows:

The origin of some of the attacks mentioned in Table 3 is up for heated debate as the parties concerned accuse each other of skulduggery and conspiratorial activity. In many cases, hard evidence pointing the finger at a specific culprit is rather difficult to gather which provides a level of immunity from risk for the perpetrators.

Targeted attacks on large corporate entities could, no doubt, yield valuable information which can eventually be used for significant financial gain, whether through a transfer of intellectual property, sabotage of competitor infrastructure, or a straightforward theft of classified financial data. The perceived or real benefits from such attacks for the perpetrators provide a clear incentive to invest resources.

Under these circumstances of high reward versus relatively low risk, and given the recent record of security breaches, the trend of targeted cyber attacks against corporations looks set to continue, and probably at an increasing rate.

Malware in Societal Conflicts

Terrorism may be defined as the systematic use of coercive tactics to instil fear in a targeted group as a means to the end of a perceived political gain.

Conflicts between different groups, whether within the bounds of the same sovereign territory or across international frontiers, have existed since the dawn of mankind. Some of the high-profile modern day conflicts involve actors, “state” or “non-state”, based in Asia who resort to forms of terrorism, whose definition and application to any given scenario is highly subjective, in an attempt to seek political mileage or redress against perceived grievances.

Given the advance of technology and the ubiquity of computer systems, many in critical infrastructure, acts of terror have included or are likely to include, at an increasing rate, attacks via binary media, i.e. code, software, etc. These attacks may be described as “Cyber Terrorism”.

Groups involved in international terrorist activities, many based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, include individuals familiar with modern computer systems and communication channels. Groups such as “al-Qaeda” allegedly have a dedicated R&D wing with ‘digital specialists’ successfully exploiting smartphone platforms for the theft of sensitive data. Given the impact it would likely have in spreading anxiety, there is a possibility, nay probability, that attempts will be made to cause the targeted destruction of systems in the future, via the mass deployment of malware, in addition to data theft.

Sometimes civilian bodies have been targeted by groups which are unlikely to be described as “militant”. Rather, it is possible that the civilian bodies themselves may conform to the definition of “militant”, yet another subjective and emotive term. For example, there have been numerous, but intermittent, malware attacks on pro-Tibet groups in recent years, the ones in 2008 just before the Beijing Olympics being widely reported by the media and in various IT security blogs. Many of these attacks involve the use of documents such as PPT and PDF containing crafted exploit code (some attacks have involved browser exploits), mailed to known individuals or posted to various fora. Attacks such as these have been alleged to originate in China , but some or all of them could have involved a social engineering angle, financially motivated, to exploit the media attention attributed to societal conflicts in areas such as Palestine or Tibet . Once again, it is difficult to garner specific evidence to arraign any one party. It remains to be seen how malware might be used in the future against such groups as the number of documented incidents appears to be waning.

The security industry has played, and will continue to play, a role in mitigating and remediating many of these attacks since the victims tend to be ordinary civilians, even if specifically targeted on occasion, and visibility of such attacks is relatively high.

To final instalment…

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Samir Mody
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In a Nutshell

Conventionally, the very first known PC virus, Brain, was created in Asia (Pakistan) in 1986. No doubt this fact would come as a surprise to the vast majority of the general public of computer users worldwide. Asia has a certain history of malware-creation, however, over the years, the profile of malware emanating from Asia has changed considerably in terms of, inter alia, the volume, scope, purpose and geographic hub.

It is now common knowledge that most modern malware in general are written with a financial motive, whilst older malware were written primarily for kudos. The history of Asian malware follows a similar trend. There were a few high-profile global malware epidemics which originated in Asia, and there were several examples of script-kiddy autorun worms from South-East Asia and the Indian sub-continent which contain attention-seeking messages. These have not died away completely, however, nowadays much of the malware is professionally written for revenue generation or increasingly for cyber warfare, and the geographic location has shifted to major nations in East-Asia.

The evolution of malware originating in Asia is worth investigating in order to attempt to predict its future course, whilst perhaps also beginning to find solutions to the issues to stem the flow. Let us explore the history of Asian malware, focussing on the recent past, with a look at the core issues at hand. Note, many of the sentiments expressed in this piece are my own.

The Year was 1986

A fateful year, 1986 was a watershed in the field of computer security, the very concept of which was perhaps merely embryonic at the time. Computers were not globally ubiquitous and interconnected as they are today, and negative thoughts about the ability to compromise systems were unlikely to be at the forefront of people’s minds.

However, the Brain virus, oft-quoted as the earliest PC virus, must perforce have somewhat changed the mindset about computer security. This virus, incidentally of the boot sector variety, was created in Pakistan by brothers Basit and Amjad Farooq Alvi . The creators of the virus asseverate that their intent was to protect their own medical software from piracy rather than to cause any damage. Notwithstanding, the Brain virus did spread to several computers around the world, and reportedly was the cause of more than a little irritation.

There are a couple of salient points which ought to be highlighted explicitly. Firstly, the incipient PC malware trend had its roots in Asia, and second, the misguided raison d’etre for the first known virus was the protection of intellectual property. The vital characteristics of the global malware trend were to change markedly over the next quarter of a century.

From Asia … With (Some) Love

The specifically Asian slice of the malware creation pie over the course of the ‘90s and the early 2000s may not be substantial in terms of raw volumes, however, there have been a few high-profile examples of malware which appear to have originated in Asia which are worthy of note:

The examples of malware in Table 1 were likely to have been written for kudos more than anything else.

The Autorun Worm Factory

Microsoft released the first version of Windows XP in August, 2001, and a couple of years thereafter events conspired to create a scourge of “Autorun worms”. Autorun worms, a modern ersatz avatar of the retro boot sector viruses in terms of basic intent, tend to spread from computer to computer via removable devices such as USB memory sticks. The global spread of Autorun worms has been aided greatly by the following:

• Introduction of the AutoPlay feature in Windows XP
• Windows XP being the most common operating system for PCs between 2005 and 2010
• The ubiquity of removable devices and nonchalant sharing of the same
• Increasing popularity and support for Visual Basic (VB) and Visual Basic Script (VBS)
• A proliferation of Narcissistic Asian script-kiddies seeking attention

Many of the samples of Autorun worms released during the mid-2000s originated in Asia, e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and the Indian sub-continent. The main motive for writing these worms could only have been kudos since many of them had references to alleged love interests or other juvenile string content, some of it in the vernacular, embedded in the files. One family of Autorun worms from India even had resource strings calling themselves “Khatra” which means “danger” in Hindi.

Examples of Autorun worms still abound, however the origin, scope and intent of these worms are different in the more recent context. Many families of recent malware, including the notorious Conficker (aka Downadup or Kido) and Sality, do use removable device as part of their spreading mechanisms, however, the point of note is that these recent malware are written with a financial motive rather than for kudos. The infamous Stuxnet worm from 2010, which also used the Autorun feature, had a sinister, albeit non-financial, motive. Interestingly, Stuxnet almost certainly originated in Asia.

To Second instalment …

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Samir Mody
Senior Manager, K7TCL

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The K7TCL team is back from AVAR 2011, Hong Kong.

As reserve speakers, Samuel Jebamani, Saravanan Mohankumar and myself did not get the opportunity to present. However V Dhanalakshmi was able to present to an appreciative audience.

There were a couple of interesting presentations, apart from Dhana’s, and it was good to touch base with the usual suspects from the Anti-Virus community.

The AVAR2011 organisers will be making all the conference slides, including Dhana’s “Paranoid Android?”, available publicly reasonably soon. In addition, I’ll be publishing my own paper, describing Asian malware, as blog postings in weekly instalments. Stay tuned if you’re interested.

Samir Mody
Senior Manager, K7TCL

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V Dhanalakshmi will be presenting on the increasing threat of Android malware and how to protect oneself from these threats in her talk titled “Paranoid Android?” on the 10th of November at 10am. Samuel Jebamani, Saravanan Mohankumar and myself have reserve presentations prepared on the topics of MBR threats, malicious VB P-Code detection, and Asian malware respectively. All four papers will be available in the conference proceedings.

We hope to see you all there.

Samir Mody
Senior Manager, K7TCL

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