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May 7th, 2018
This blog discusses the exploitation of user data as a risk to national security.

The transformation of user data into a point of contention between countries has been precipitated as apps developed in one country are being popularly used by the citizens of other countries and covert agencies becoming increasingly cognizant of the potential of using ‘foreign user’ data for strategic advantage. This has actually been an issue for many years but it is being discussed in the mainstream only now, triggered by the recent Cambridge Analytica controversy and its ramifications.

Smartphone users’ data is juicier than desktop users’ data as it contains more detail on the users’ day-to-day activity, ranging from status updates to taking a selfie to geo tagging. Everything is a point of interest for market analysis, even for entities beyond a country’s borders.

With some countries openly accusing foreign apps of espionage, and many others discreetly suspicious of them, the Indian government has asked its military personnel to uninstall a list of Chinese apps. This is not the first time the Indian government has asked its defence community to be wary of Chinese hardware and software. Some of the apps named in the recent list of blacklisted apps are:

  • Weibo
  • WeChat
  • SHAREit
  • UC Browser
  • Mi Community
  • Mi Store
  • 360 Security

A look at the geolocation of servers that many of these apps connect to showed the following:

SHAREit (com.lenovo.anyshare.gps) ( MD5: CB2C0A445B571035CE38CEAB91E01EBC )

WeChat (com.tencent.mm) ( MD5: CF237D05AB4782081AC70CBD2210EE3E )

UC Browser (com.UCMobile.intl) ( MD5: CA56AB59D7E6CE87A0B690DBF083487B )

The advantage of having an App’s server in one’s own country is that the data storage and protection is subject to the regulations and policies of the land. Looking at the permissions requested by these apps during installation, some are questionable:
  • android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS
  • android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION

When installing an app, users should always carefully go through the list of access permissions requested by the app and should not just mechanically tap the “Accept” button.

We examined a few of the apps blacklisted by the Indian government to check the kind of information being sent to the parent server. We did not find anything malicious but as seen in the two screenshots below, potentially sensitive information like device-id, build model, android version, etc. are being sent to parent servers located in China. Device-Id, also popularly known as IMEI number, is a common artefact collected by many apps for legitimate purposes. But from a privacy point of view, device-id is a unique and better artefact than IP address to identify an individual device and thereby allowing the tracking an individual user’s habits on the device. This helps marketing agencies to target the individual with tailored ads and certainly helps nations in (psychological) cyberwarfare against each other.

The screenshots presented below show an instance of various data collected by one of the apps we analysed.
Figure1: Snapshot of data enumerated by an app

Figure 2: Snapshot of data enumerated by another app

The image below shows one of the apps sending the data to its server.

Figure3: Data being sent to the parent server in china

Today, as users are already getting used to the intrusion on their privacy and beginning to consider it as  part of normal modern life, it’s getting difficult to come up with a clear demarcation of what’s good app behaviour and what’s not vis-à-vis PII (i.e. “Personally Identifiable Information”).

However the onus of gauging and enforcing data privacy standards and security should not be placed on the user, buried deep inside some EULA (i.e. “End User License Agreement”) full of legalese in small print which most people wouldn’t understand even if they read it. Instead it must be a moral and legal requisite of the app owners to maintain certain minimum standards enforced by regulatory government bodies. This is one of the prominent issues addressed by the European Union’s GDPR whose imminent implementation should be beneficial to users both in the European Union, and elsewhere by proxy.

Users are advised to always install apps only from the official Google Playstore. But given the scenario today that for any popular app on the Google Playstore there are many fake apps and malicious clones on the Playstore itself, an average user has to be all the more careful in selecting the correct app.

Baran Kumar.S & Sunil
Threat Research Team

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April 6th, 2018

This blog post presents a dissection of a Windows malware that operates via an IoT channel for its Command & Control communication. We are also going to explore this malware’s infection vectors to understand how it gets itself onto a victim’s computer.

Infecting a machine without raising suspicion is only half the challenge, the comparatively easy part. Actively maintaining the state of control is the other, more difficult part of the challenge. Off late threat actors are inclined towards third-party APIs for Command and Control (C&C) services as they are easier to establish, more stable and have the advantage of not being flagged by network monitoring tools. Third-party services are also more difficult to take down. In this blog we are going to look at one such malware which uses the PubNub infrastructure for its C&C needs.

With the increased use of Internet-enabled “smart” devices, also known as “Internet of Things” or IoT for short, and the multitude of services offered for them, cyber criminals have started exploring new waters. The specific malware in question uses PubNub, an infrastructure-as-a-service company, as a channel of communication between the infected devices and its C&C.

PubNub is a global data stream network that provides APIs for real-time applications and IoT devices. It can be used to quickly push small messages to one or more devices like smartphones, tablets, desktops, microcontrollers, etc.”

At the time of writing not many of the available network security products block malicious network traffic over this channel. Let’s start with how this malware infects a device, and then move on to other details.

We believe this malware targets devices in the Chinese geographical region, and here’s why: it masquerades as the security product “360 Total Security” – an offereing from the Chinese company Qihoo 360. In fact it gets downloaded from a fake webpage that poses as Qihoo 360’s official download page: hxxp://ebsmpi[.]com/ipin/360/

We looked at the website itself. As one would expect this website had no connection whatsoever with Qihoo 360, and what’s worse, the website is actually of Korean origin, not Chinese. A quick visit to this website’s homepage told us that it provides standards for psychological examination of school children and that it belongs to the Korean Educational Broadcasting System (EBS). Furthermore, the website was registered more than 3 years ago, meaning it is possibly a legitimate domain (i.e. not a domain registered just to distribute malware) that has probably been compromised, being used to serve up malicious content without the site admin’s knowledge, leave alone consent.

We then compared the file downloaded from the fake page with Qihoo’s legitimate installer. Other than identical icons and file names, the two files were completely different. The file size of the malware sample was less than that of the actual file as it is only a downloader component.

On execution the sample downloaded and installed the actual 360 Total Security to avoid suspicion. A code snippet from the sample (see image below) revealed that the installer is not downloaded from the official page but from another Korean domain which seems to be legitimate, and has been around since 2013, meaning this site is also probably compromised.

In addition the sample does the following in the background:

  • Downloads the final payload (Ant_3.5.exe) and its encrypted configuration file (desktops.ini) at the root of the user’s %AppData% directory (see images below)
  • The downloaded payload is renamed to svchost.exe and executed
  • Registry entry pointing to the payload is created for persistence

While these activities happen in the background, the unsuspecting user is presented with the GUI from the actual 360 Total Security.

The below image, courtesy of app.any.run, shows the execution flow:

The final payload (svchost.exe) is a .NET compiled binary with no obfuscation whatsoever. A simple .NET de-compiler helped explore the malicious code present within it. It was found that it utilizes PubNub APIs to await remote commands from the bot master(s).

It decrypts its configuration file (desktops.ini) by performing byte wise XOR with 2310.

Desktops.ini referred in final payload


Decryption function inside final payload

As per PubNub: “[PubNub] utilizes a Publish/Subscribe model for real-time data streaming and device signaling which lets you establish and maintain persistent socket connections to any device and push data to global audiences in less than ¼ of a second. You can publish messages to any given channel, and subscribing clients receive only messages associated with that channel. The message payload can be any JSON data including numbers, strings, arrays, and objects.”

The contents of the decrypted configuration file hold the information to perform the above-mentioned communication. We can see the Subscribe key, publish key, origin (ps.pndsn.com) and channel name as PROCESS. The UUID is the machine name + MAC address.

PubNub provides a Subscribe Key and Publish Key on sign-up for using the service. A publishing client pushes messages to his/her respective channel(s), and a subscribing client receives only messages associated with the subscribed channel(s). A PubNub message consists of the channel information and associated data that needs to be carried across.

In this case, the publishing client is the bot master and the subscribing clients are the infected devices. Upon receiving any message from ps.pndsn.com through the PROCESS channel, the function related to the message gets executed on the subscribing client. All messages are sent over SSL, and hence the network traffic grab doesn’t give out any tangible information.

The below image shows the functionality associated with receipt of the “COMMAND_RUN” message present inside the final payload:

Many bot malware related commands were present within the final payload as shown below:

NONE,
HELLO_REQUEST,
HELLO_REPLY,
BYE_REQUEST,
BYE_REPLY,
DRIVE_REQUEST,
DRIVE_REPLY,
FILE_REQUEST,
FILE_REPLY,
UPDATE_REQUEST,
UPDATE_REPLY,
COPY_REQUEST,
COPY_REPLY,
CUT_REQUEST,
CUT_REPLY,
RENAME_REQUEST,
RENAME_REPLY,
DELETE_REQUEST,
DELETE_REPLY,
UPLOAD_REQUEST,
UPLOAD_REPLY,
UPLOAD_CONTENT,
UPLOAD_CONTENT_REPLY,
UPLOAD_END,
UPLOAD_END_REPLY,
DOWNLOAD_REQUEST,
DOWNLOAD_REPLY,
DOWNLOAD_CONTENT,
DOWNLOAD_CONTENT_REPLY,
DOWNLOAD_END,
DOWNLOAD_END_REPLY,
COMMAND_RUN,
COMMAND_RUN_REPLY,
PROCESS_STOP,
PROCESS_STOP_REPLY,
PROCESS_REFRESH,
PROCESS_REFRESH_REPLY,
SCREEN,
SCREEN_REPLY,
SCREEN_CONTENT,
SCREEN_CONTENT_REPLY,
SCREEN_END,
SCREEN_END_REPLY,
CONFIG_REQUEST,
CONFIG_REPLY

Same malware, different attack vector

The same malware has also been observed to have be delivered as an email attachment. In this case, it is a Korean document about a Chinese commerce meeting. The document exploits the CVE-2018-0802 vulnerability in Microsoft Word to deliver the payload.

The document contains an OLE object embedded inside of it.

Payload: hxxp://cgalim[.]com/admin/hr/hr.doc


The downloaded payload (hr.doc) is actually a malicious executable which downloads the final payload and its configuration file as seen in the previous case.

As always, it is advised to stay up-to-date with a reputed security product like K7 Total Security to ward off such malware infections. K7 Total Security detects and blocks all executables and URLs associated with this malware.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
File details

Downloader (Fake Installer – 360TS_Setup_Mini.exe)

CA282452467647F34D62B46F6F5E3B1E    Trojan-Downloader ( 00524c8e1 )

Other downloaders

24FE3FB56A61AAD6D28CCC58F283017C    Trojan-Downloader ( 005246211 )
97FECA6E73BB787533C6BD17EDA80582    Trojan-Downloader ( 00524c8e1 )
97BA95D3684F460BCFD2EF60494C5F98    Trojan ( 0001140e1 )

Final Payload (Ant_4.5.exe / Ant_3.5.exe)

84CBBB8CDAD90FBA8B964297DD5C648A    Trojan ( 00524e851 )
FF32383F207B6CDD8AB6CBCBA26B1430    Trojan ( 00524e851 )

Email attachment (Invition.doc / bitcoin.doc / hr.doc / 2018버블 전망.doc)

37D82F3D219E96EE9381D6DF93510D1D    Trojan ( 0001140e1 )
7817D9240AB39FE28EDD3A44E468439D    Trojan ( 0001140e1 )
62350386B7F56679A3D7F2C9027A665A    Trojan ( 0051f3601 )

URLs list

hxxp:// ebsmpi[.]com /ipin/360/down.php
hxxp:// ebsmpi[.]com /ipin/360/desktops.ini
hxxp:// ebsmpi[.]com /ipin/360/ant_4.5.exe
hxxp:// ebsmpi[.]com /ipin/360/ant_3.5.exe
hxxp:// cgalim[.]com /admin/1211me/Ant_3.5.exe
hxxp:// cgalim[.]com /admin/1211me/desktops.ini
hxxp:// cgalim[.]com /admin/1211me/Servlet.exe
hxxp:// cgalim[.]com /admin/hr
hxxp:// cgalim[.]com /admin/hr/hr.doc
hxxp:// cgalim[.]com /admin/hr/temp.set

Dinesh D
Threat Researcher, K7TCL

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February 23rd, 2018

This blog intends to describe a few new techniques used by the latest versions of Exobot, an Android Banking Trojan. These new techniques have been introduced to complicate the process of reversing engineering and to evade detection by security products.

It is only natural that, with huge increase in the number of Android smartphones users and availability of mobile banking services, cybercriminals have focused on malware targeting banking apps and other apps that enable financial transactions to embezzle funds from victims’ accounts. Devices infected with such malware would subject the users to be victims of the following (non-exhaustive):

• Financial loss
• Loss of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
• Loss of privacy

Typically, banking Trojans await instructions from remote Command-and-Control (C&C) servers, thus allowing the attacker(s) to potentially turn compromised devices into involuntary but blissful bots. Also, the bad guys tend to keep changing their distribution mechanisms and infection routines (without compromising the severity of intended damage) to evade detection by security products. Unsurprisingly, Android banking Trojans are no exceptions in these aspects.

Exobot is an Android banking Trojan like any other. As described in our previous blog it steals users’ banking credentials from infected devices to enable the attacker(s) to siphon off their funds.

But here’s how this piece of malware is different. Our analysis revealed some interesting implementation techniques employed in recent versions for detection evasion which we have depicted in the following picture:

In case you find the above picture to be not-so-self-explanatory, please read on for a more detailed explanation on the differences between the older (Exobot V1) and newer (Exobot V2) versions.

Technique 1:

Exobot V1’s AndroidManifest.xml file contains all broadcast receivers, permissions and other privileges registered to perform malicious activities. All its eggs in one basket.

Exobot V1 Permissions

Exobot V2, on the other hand, has its requirements spread out. Basic installation and device admin registration are requested in the primary component (earlier available on the Google Play Store, but thankfully not anymore), which then downloads a secondary bot component, the requirements of which are handled within its own AndroidManifest.xml.

Exobot V2 Permissions split between parent and dropped components

The secondary component, downloaded from the URL shown in the following picture, then tries to connect to different C&C servers to receive commands from remote attacker(s).

It is noteworthy that the primary component retries downloading the secondary component multiple times (up to 5 times in the variant we analyzed) at regular intervals in case of failures when connecting to the URL specified. If all attempts to connect to this URL fail, it then tries to connect to other C&C servers from a predefined list.
Technique 2:

Exobot V1 is very trusting. It starts its malicious activities without checking the configuration of the device on which it is running. Exobot V2 is more cautious. It deploys multiple verification mechanisms before behaving badly. Here are the most interesting of such checks it carries out before proceeding with its infection routine.

Checks if device is connected to debugger



where,
n.df + n.fv + n.eF – android.os.Debug
n.es + n.eG + n.fu – isDebuggerConnected

Verifies if device configuration does not match any of the below criteria

  • Is the malware running within a test environment, say an emulator? Does any one of the below default values of an emulator match with the extracted values from the device?
    • Build.MODEL is “google_sdk or Emulator or Android SDK built for x86″
    • Build.MANUFACTURER is “Genymotion” (“GenyMotion” is an emulator frequently  used for QA or tests)
    • Build.PRODUCT is “google_sdk or sdk or sdk_x86 or vbox86p”
    • DeviceId is like “000000000000000” or “012345678912345” or “004999010640000″
    • VERSION.RELEASE is “0”
  • Is the compromised device connected to a test network?
    • SIM operator is “android” or “emergency calls only” or “fake carrier”
If any of the above match, execution stops



Checks and sets the malicious app as the default SMSPackage



The Android OS has the flexibility to programmatically set a user app as the default app to handle SMS. Exobot V2 leverages this option to be the first to access incoming SMS, as well as to suppress the messages from other installed apps by aborting the “SMS_Received” broadcast.
Verifies if “MAIN_VERSION_REQUIRED” is less than a specific threshold value to ensure that the bot can run on the device, i.e. on that particular version of Android OS


Where n.aT maps to “Bot is not able to run that command” and n.aU maps to “Command execution system error”.

Technique 3:

Exobot V2 also mimics an anti-reversing technique from its Windows-based counterparts. All the strings in the malware’s code are obfuscated, though with a very simple logic of inserting junk characters in between. For example:

a(“start”) may be converted to something like a(“s**EJz**t**EJz**a**EJz**r**EJz**t**EJz**”)

In the above example, “**EJz**” are the junk characters.

Our lab researchers regularly track Android banking Trojans, especially for their behavioral and technical differences, in order to ensure we are able to block the malware at the earliest with new and updated detection methodologies. K7 Mobile Security users are protected against both the older and newer versions of this malware.

Exobot V1 (example sample hash: b4064f4bca2ac0780a5e557b551a3755) is detected as “Spyware ( 004fdfc01 )”.

Exobot V2: The primary component (example sample hash: 6924d51242386e3c20c84f017f1838b9) is detected as “Trojan-Downloader ( 004f07451 )”, and the secondary component (example sample hash: f66e30974435e5ef092aeb7c9e5cad7a) is detected as “Trojan ( 005243d11 )”.

As always K7 Threat Control Lab makes the following recommendations:
  • Use a highly-reputable mobile security product such as K7 Mobile Security to block any infection
  • Regularly update the mobile OS and security applications installed to be free of mobile malware
  • Refrain from installing apps recommended by strangers
  • Review the reputation of any app before downloading and installing it
  • Choose to download and install apps only from the official Google Play store, as immediate & regular security actions are taken in emergency situations
  • Do not enable “Download from Unknown Sources”

V.Dhanalakshmi
Senior Threat Researcher

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January 8th, 2018
There has been some recent media interest in one variant of Android Banking Trojans, also known as ‘Bankbots’. Bankbots have been around for a pretty long time now, i.e. nothing new, and the variant of unusual interest was already blocked by K7 Mobile Security as Trojan ( 0051c57a1 ).

As the name suggests Banking Trojans help hackers to steal money from a user’s account without his/her knowledge. This particular Android Banking Trojan scans the list of running apps for package names related to popular banking apps from all over the world in order to intercept incoming bank-related SMS messages, suppressing them from the user and redirecting them to a remote hacker. It can accept commands from a C&C server.

This Banking Trojan disguises itself as a Flash Player app hosted on third party markets. In order to carry out its malicious behavior silently the Trojan requests the user to provide device administrator privileges.

For this Trojan to start its malicious behavior it registers many receivers for various actions on the device as listed below:

  • android.provider.Telephony.SMS_DELIVER
  • android.provider.Telephony.WAP_PUSH_DELIVER
  • android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.intent.action.QUICKBOOT_POWERON
  • android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT
  • android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED
  • android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REMOVED
  • android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED
  • android.intent.action.SCREEN_ON
  • android.intent.action.EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_AVAILABLE
  • android.intent.category.HOME
  • android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE
  • android.net.wifi.WIFI_STATE_CHANGED
  • android.intent.action.DREAMING_STOPPED
  • android.app.action.DEVICE_ADMIN_DISABLED
  • android.app.action.ACTION_DEVICE_ADMIN_DISABLE_REQUESTED
  • android.app.action.DEVICE_ADMIN_ENABLED

One of the receivers “yqyJqWdtdf.UOaOrquyRDgLFgGueha.resiverboot” that is registered for the SMS_Received broadcast is shown below:

The Trojan also requests for the following permissions:

  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.GET_TASKS
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
  • android.permission.READ_SMS
  • android.permission.WRITE_SMS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.SEND_SMS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

Interestingly upon launching this malware, i.e. upon clicking on the Flash Player icon in the app list, the Flash Player icon hides itself so that the user may not be aware of the malicious activity happening in the background.

The main activity class decodes a base64-encoded dex file, budda2.dex which is contained within the class as follows:

The decoded dex file contains the code responsible for incoming SMS interception, sending SMS and other malicious behavior.

Upon following one of the receivers, resiverboot for android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED, budda2.dex is called internally as shown in the image below:

RiciverSMS from Budda2.dex file has the code to intercept incoming SMS messages as shown below:

As highlighted above the StopSound function changes the ringer mode to ‘0’ to avoid the user being notified of incoming messages.

DelIndox and DelSent deletes the messages from a particular originating address from the Inbox and sends the items respectively as shown below:

And it sends these to the hacker as per the command shown below:

This malware turns the compromised device into a bot, and the installed malware keeps listening for a command from the C&C server to carry out orders. The C&C can issue commands to the malware to even kill itself as well as shown below:

All the collected information is sent to the hacker including whether the bot is active or not. The hacker’s infection status dashboard is maintained as shown below:

This malware verifies if any one of the below mentioned banking apps or those dealing with financial transactions in the installed on the device. Few of the popular banking apps across the world are listed below:

International:
com.amazon.mShop.android.shopping
com.ebay.mobile
com.westernunion.android.mtapp
com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking
io.coinmarketapp.app

India:
hdfcbank.hdfcquickbank
com.csam.icici.bank.imobile
com.axis.mobile
sbi.SBIFreedomPlus
snapwork.IDBI
idbibank.abhay_card
co.bankofbaroda.mpassbook
unionbank.ecommerce.mobile.android

USA:
com.wf.wellsfargomobile
com.westernunion.android.mtapp
com.usbank.mobilebanking
com.usaa.mobile.android.usaa
com.unionbank.ecommerce.mobile.android
com.thunkable.android.avenue_mitm.Polonix

Germany:
de.schildbach.wallet
de.postbank.finanzassistent
de.leowandersleb.bitcoinsw
de.langerhans.wallet
de.fiducia.smartphone.android.banking.vr
de.dkb.portalapp
de.consorsbank
de.commerzbanking.mobil
de.comdirect.android
mobile.santander.de

Australia:
org.stgeorge.bank
org.bom.bank
org.banksa.bank

Russia:
ru.yandex.money
ru.vtb24.mobilebanking.android
ru.simpls.mbrd.ui
ru.simpls.brs2.mobbank
ru.sberbankmobile
ru.rosbank.android
ru.raiffeisennews
ru.mw
ru.alfabank.mobile.android
com.webmoney.my

UK:
uk.co.bankofscotland.businessbank
com.barclays.android.barclaysmobilebanking
com.rbs.mobile.investisir
com.rbs.mobile.android.ubr
com.rbs.mobile.android.natwestoffshore

France:
net.bnpparibas.mescomptes
mobi.societegenerale.mobile.lappli
fr.lcl.android.customerarea
fr.laposte.lapostemobile
fr.creditagricole.androidapp
fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus
fr.axa.monaxa

Turkey:
dk.ozgur.btcprice
com.vakifbank.mobile
com.pozitron.iscep
com.ziraat.ziraatmobil
com.ykb.android

Please note that apps such as document readers and Flash Players:

  1. Do NOT require device administrator privileges.
  2. Should not typically request for permissions to “SEND, WRITE OR RECEIVE SMS

Please avoid installing such applications.

As always we at K7 Threat Control lab make the following recommendations:
  • Use a top-rated mobile security product such as K7 Mobile Security to block any infection
  • Regularly update the mobile OS and security applications installed to be free of mobile malware
  • Carefully analyze the messages or alerts which apps display before taking any action
  • Refrain from installing apps recommended by strangers
  • Review the reputation of any app before downloading and installing it
  • Choose to download and install apps only from the official Google Play store
  • Do not enable “Download from Unknown Sources”

C&C server Image courtesy:
github.com/jacobsoo/J-Hunter/tree/master/Android

Dhanalakshmi.V & Baran Kumar.S

K7 Threat Control Lab

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October 27th, 2017

It is the era of Ransomware and Halloween is just around the corner. We have witnessed yet another ransomware outbreak for the calendar year, lashing eastern European countries and Russia.

This ransomware dubbed “BadRabbit” hit systems in Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Germany and even Japan and South Korea, as per news agency reports. Russia and Ukraine have been the worst hit countries, with Kiev Metro and the Odessa airport in the Ukraine being early casualties. An official statement to this effect was released by CERT Ukraine.

It appears the initial outbreak for this ransomware was via drive-by downloads from hacked news agency sites in Russia. The dropper ransomware was served up as an “update for Flash Player installer”, duly named install_flash_player.exe (FBBDC39AF1139AEBBA4DA004475E8839). Ah, social engineering does still work a treat, doesn’t it?

The infected sites contained a script which resolved to the following URL:
h**p://1dnscontrol[.]com/flash_install

The domain 1dnscontrol[.]com was been taken down pretty quickly.

BadRabbit, similar to WannaCry and NotPetya, in the sense that it is multi-component, using several complimentary executable files to infect the user machine. There are even code (none of them employ any form of code obfuscation) and filename similarities between these families. In BadRabbit and NotPetya the main infection modules are actually DLL files but have a ‘.dat’ extension.

The main dropper masquerading as a Flash Player installer must be run with admin privileges since its components are to be written to the C:\Windows directory as follows:

  • c:\windows\infpub.dat -> Main encryption and infection module : DLL (2FE32D2A6BFC72D215496B055E5A53AD)
  • c:\windows\cscc.dat -> Driver file from diskcryptor.net : SYS (B4E6D97DAFD9224ED9A547D52C26CE02)
  • c:\windows\dispci.exe -> Part of the disk encryption module and responsible for the MBR infection : EXE (B14D8FAF7F0CBCFAD051CEFE5F39645F)
  • c:\Readme.txt -> Text file with information about the encrypted files and how to get them back

Scheduled tasks are created to initiate other modules of the infection and to reboot the system. Unusually, the system reboots twice during the entire infection cycle.

Once the main dropper is executed it drops a DLL file which is the file encryption module. It gets initiated using rundll32.exe as shown below:

The argument passed to the infpub.dat denotes that the first export function is referenced by ordinal number followed by the number 15, which is the time until reboot.

As shown in the code snippet below, the main dropper creates infpub.dat in the Windows directory and then calls CreateProcessW to invoke it. Once the DLL is initiated the process of encryption begins.

infpub.dat is in charge of the following:

  • User file encryption
  • Adding scheduled tasks to reboot the machine and initiate the next module
  • Looking for infection targets on the local network

For encryption the ransomware looks for specific extensions:

3ds 7z accdb ai asm asp aspx avhd back bak bmp brw c cab
cc cer cfg conf cpp crt cs ctl cxx dbf der dib disk djvu
doc docx dwg eml fdb gz h hdd hpp hxx iso java jfif jpe
jpeg jpg js kdbx key mail mdb msg nrg odc odf odg odi odm
odp ods odt ora ost ova ovf p12 p7b p7c pdf pem pfx php
pmf png ppt pptx ps1 pst pvi py pyc pyw qcow qcow2 rar rb
rtf scm sln sql tar tib tif tiff vb vbox vbs vcb vdi vfd
vhd vhdx vmc vmdk vmsd vmtm vmx vsdx vsv work xls xlsx
xml xvd zip

One of the scheduled tasks is to reboot the computer at an elapsed time (NB: this can vary depending on the number and size of files that are to be encrypted) mentioned by the main module. The other is to initiate the diskcrypter executable named as dispci.exe:

There are several references to the “Game of Thrones” TV series, e.g. the scheduled tasks are called “drogon”, “Rhaegal” and “viserion”, and the diskcryptor exe is called “GrayWorm” in the version strings in the resources.

The ransom note is dropped in c:\Readme.txt informing the user of the infection and how the files cannot be retrieved without the ransomware author’s help.

Once the encryption is done. The ransomware goes on to scan the LAN for possible infection targets. This is done by sending out requests to look for SMB shares. It uses the Mimikatz tool to scan for any traces of user credentials in memory. The ransomware then uses a list of hardcoded usernames and passwords to bruteforce into any available machine on the LAN.

This list is made up of weak and frequently-used passwords. For better insight on choosing strong passwords one can refer to one of our earlier blog posts.

Shown above is a network capture of the attempted spread to SMB shares. Once the ransomware has bruteforced into any network machine it tries to place the DLL component infpub.dat on those systems and initiates that ransomware module using Service Control Manager.

Once this is done the system gets rebooted and the diskcryptor module dispci.exe takes over. The other file dropped, cscc.dat, is actually a driver that can perform disk encryption. Note, however, that it is a legitimate file. At this point in time another schedule task gets added which is also for a reboot.

The time for triggering this task is updated several times before the scheduled task is finally executed.

Before going for the reboot the ransomware performs one final task which is to overwrite the MBR of the system. It uses CreateFileW on GLOBALROOT\ArcName\multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1) to get a handle to the MBR.

Once this is done the system reboots and displays the following message informing the user that they have wasted a lot of time trying to decrypt the files by other means.

The user is forced to retrieve their files only by paying the ransom within the timeframe given by the ransomware author. However, we at K7 Threat Control Lab urge users to refrain from paying the ransom for several reasons, including:

  1. Payment of the ransom increases the profitability of ransomware, thus fueling further attacks
  2. There is no guarantee that paying the ransom would result in getting your files back

Shown below is the onion site that displays the custom message for each user depending on their personal installation key#1. The ransom starts with 0.05 bitcoins and keeps increasing with time.

The various malicious components of the ransomware are detected by K7 as follows:

install_flash_player.exe	- Trojan ( 0051a3031 )
dispci.exe 			- Trojan ( 0051a3031 )
infpub.dat			- Trojan ( 0051a2c11 )
16605a4a29a101208457c47ebfde788487be788d – mimikatz 32-bit module - Riskware ( 0051a31b1 )
413eba3973a15c1a6429d9f170f3e8287f98c21c - mimikatz 64-bit module - Trojan ( 0051a5241 )

Apart from this the ransomware’s attempt to encrypt files is completely blocked by K7’s Ransomware Protection feature:

Kaarthik RM, Senior Threat Researcher, K7TCL
Lokesh J, Threat Researcher, K7TCL
Gladis Brinda R, Threat Researcher, K7TCL
Rajesh Kumar R, Threat Researcher, K7TCL
Mary Muthu Fransisca, Threat Researcher, K7TCL

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July 6th, 2017

In our last blog we assured users of K7 Security products that they are protected against the destructive Petya ransomware. The good news is that we’ve just tightened the noose even further! Now, not only Petya but also other malware which may exhibit similar modus operandi are going to be robustly and proactively blocked. This is an effort to safeguard our users from any such ransomware attacks in future.

Let’s have a gander through what we have done:

  • Blocking the Petya ransomware at the very early stages, even before it enters a computer by including an IDS signature to block all currently known versions of EternalBlue type packets attempting to exploit MS17-010.

  • In order to tackle a situation where a malware like Petya attempts to affect the boot area, we have reinforced a protection rule in our security products to block unauthorized writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR).

  • Last but not least, we tweaked our “Ransomware Protection” logic to block the encryption procedure peculiar to Petya.

As always, we at K7 Engineering focus on complete protection at multiple layers for our users so as to safeguard them from any (new) malware occurrences.

K7 Engineering

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July 3rd, 2017

Post WannaCry the world witnessed yet another brutal ransomware-style attack last week by Petya. Yet not a single user of a K7 Security Product reported any issue to K7 Technical Support, although Petya is known to have hit several Indian computers.

We at K7TCL constantly monitor for any new instances of malware, especially destructive ones like Petya. K7 Security Products protect their users by detecting Petya component files from the ransomware’s release time till date, as

  • Trojan (0001140e1)
  • Trojan (00510cfe1)

Unlike WannaCry, in addition to encrypting user’s data files, Petya ransomware may also modify the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the user’s machine as well, complicating the scenario still further.

The image shown above is the screen displayed on an infected computer demanding a ransom of “$300 worth of bitcoin”. However there is reason to believe that the real objective of this variant of Petya was not to make money but just to destroy data in an irreversible way.

Anyway the “ransom screen” appears after a sequence of malicious activities are performed. Let us take a quick look at the technical details of Petya and how it infects a user’s machine.

Petya ransomware comes in as a DLL file (Dynamic Link Library) and is executed as follows:

Rundll32.exe “<path to Petya.dll>” #1

Note: Petya.dll is the pseudo name of the sample executed.

Petya has several spreading techniques. One of these employs the same method as that used by WannaCry ransomware to enter a victim’s machine by exploiting a critical SMB RCE vulnerability, i.e. using EternalBlue to exploit vulnerabilities covered in the MS17-010 update. Petya is also capable of worm-like activity to spread across the systems in a network, remotely executed using PsExec.

As this malware is executed, it first checks if the following privileges are available

  1. SeShutdownPrivilege – Required to shut down a local system
  2. SeDebugPrivilege – Required to debug and adjust the memory of a process owned by another account
  3. SeTcbPrivilege – This privilege identifies its holder as part of the trusted computer base. Some trusted protected subsystems are granted this privilege

Once the Petya DLL confirms that the required privileges are available, it enumerates all the running process in the system to verify if any of the following Anti-Virus programs are installed in that system by using its own XOR encryption routine to determine a hash value.

Hash Value Process Name AV Product
0x2E214B44 avp.exe Kaspersky
0x6403527E ccSvcHst.exe Symantec
0x651B3005 NS.exe Norton

The results of both privileges checks and Anti-Virus process check are stored as bit-masked global variables that affect the flow in which this Petya malware executes on a system.

Assuming that the required checks are satisfied to run, this malware copies the entire file into virtual memory using “VirtualAlloc” and “MemCpy” APIs, so that it can delete the main file using the “DeleteFileA” API, and then jump to a new entry point in the newly created virtual space.

Then by using “LoadLibraryA” and “GetProcAddress” it dynamically rebuilds the import table of the file in virtual space. It also checks for the presence of “perfc.dat” in the Windows folder, and if found exits execution completely.

Otherwise it infects the MBR by opening a handle to logical volume \.\C:, retrieving the drive geometry and overwrites sectors at 0×200 from the start. In the same way, it also retrieves the geometry of \.\PhysicalDrive0 and overwrites sectors on that drive with malicious code.

After infecting the MBR this malware creates a scheduled task to perform a system restart after 15 minutes.

This time is utilized by malware to drop and execute a file from its resource section into the Temp folder which acts as an infostealer, and also tries to spread itself by creating threads which attempt to enumerate all subnets of the local network, then trying to connect to each IP to test its SMB ports.

As the restart task triggers, it displays a fake Chkdsk.exe repair screen as it tries to encrypt the hard drive as shown below

Once the encryption is done, as the final step it shows a ransom note demanding $300 as shown earlier.

Apart from the continuous protection from K7 Security products against malware, we recommend users to regularly and urgently deploy security updates for the operating system as soon as available.

Shiv Chand
Senior Threat Researcher, K7TCL

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June 1st, 2017

teachninja.jpg

One year ago we at K7 affirmed our deep commitment to education. Since then, in addition to the official, successful delivery of our multi-module K7 Security Academy training programme to several universities, it is with utmost pleasure that we also formally announce that we have signed an MoU with Teach for India.

Over the past decade Teach for India has done a sterling job across several parts of the country in delivering top-quality education to thousands of children from the lower income strata of our society. This work is a national priority, of course, and we at K7 are extremely proud to contribute to this great cause.

It is with much hope and excitement that we stand at the threshold of a new era of didactic activity on many fronts for K7 Computing. Join us, learn, teach!

Image courtesy of whatwouldjackdo.net.

Samir Mody
AVP, K7TCL

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May 16th, 2017

WannaCry ransomware, a security disaster has already infected thousands of computers all over the world, especially in Russia, India and China, and has hit emergency services in various countries, e.g. the UK. There have been images of infected ATMs, gigantic billboards, etc., making this attack a high-profile event.

This attack is a macabre reminder of the ill effects of

  • exploiting a critical vulnerability in the Windows OS
  • using a pirated version of an operating system
  • leaving computer unpatched and connected to the internet, in other words highly vulnerable

In most of the attack scenarios tracked, WannaCry ransomware infects a computer by using the “EternalBlue” exploit (developed by the NSA and released to the public by Shadowbrokers in April 2017), which exploits a critical vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 server (CVE-2017-0143 to CVE-2017-0148) by sending a specially-crafted packet. There was a Microsoft patch MS17-010 available to fix this vulnerability released in March 2017. It is also alleged, although without any concrete evidence, that this malware may enter a computer by the common email-borne route.

Please note that K7 security products contains heuristic anti-ransomware functionality which is capable of stopping WannaCry in its tracks without any signatures updates (please read the Virus Bulletin blog which includes a video of K7’s talk from 2015 about fighting back against ransomware). However to ensure stopping all variants of the ransomware before any encryption starts, we at K7 Threat Control Lab have taken the necessary steps to block it at all of its possible execution points. Users of K7 Security products are protected against this ransomware and the detection names at the time of writing are as follows:

Trojan (0050db011)

Trojan (0050d8371)

Trojan (0050d7201)

In addition, K7 blocks this multi-component malware with the behavioral detection as

Suspicious Program ( ID21236 )

Suspicious Program ( ID21237 )

Suspicious Program ( ID21238 )

Before we look at the technical details of this malware and explore how it works we must urge users to apply the latest Windows patches which Microsoft has made available even for the unsupported Windows XP, and may be applicable on pirated versions of Windows too (note, using pirated software is an extremely bad idea). In order to better protect the computer against being exploited from an external source, blocking in-bound connections on TCP ports 139 and 445 and UDP ports 137 and 138 might be an option to carefully consider. The client firewall in K7 Security Products can be configured to restrict traffic as described on the mentioned ports.

In addition there has been some misinformation aggressively disseminated on social media and the news that using a certain password which is embedded in the code can be used to decrypt the encrypted data. This is far from the truth. WannaCry uses the embedded password to decrypt its internal embedded ZIP containing ransomware components. Users are strongly advised to ignore any mention about this password and avoid being influenced by a whole lot of scaremongering junk information being released irresponsibly. There is currently no way to retrieve all the encrypted data barring use of the cyber criminals’ own decryption service at a cost of US$300-US$600.

WannaCry involves multiple executable files to infect an end user.  The main dropper EXE accesses the URL as shown in the images below,

This URL is now known as the “kill switch” since if it is accessible the dropper stops execution. Such a “kill switch” is unprecedented in the history of ubiquitous run-of-the-mill ransomware and raises interesting questions about the true purpose of the attack. Interestingly the above domain has now been registered by researchers, thus stopping the attack at the dropper stage in many situations. There are few recent samples which ignores whether or not the URL connection is successful.

MD5: d724d8cc6420f06e8a48752f0da11c66

MD5: E8089341EE0442A2ECF82E4B70829143

Anyway, let’s assume the executable proceeds with its malicious behavior. The dropper EXE starts itself as a service with the security parameters as “-m security”, service name “mssecsvc2.0” and display name as “Microsoft Security Center (2.0) service”

Then it tries to load the payload executable which it carries within itself under the resource named “R” in the sample which we analyzed (d5dcd28612f4d6ffca0cfeaefd606bcf).

In any PE parsing tool, it shows that the resource contains an embedded PE

It extracts the file with the name “tasksche.exe” under the directory called “windows\<randomname>” as shown below. Note, we have also seen occurrences of this file being dropped under “ProgramData\<randomname>.”

After which the dropper starts the payload “tasksche.exe” using CreateProcessA. The payload tasksche.exe (84C82835A5D21BBCF75A61706D8AB549) contains the required functionality for encrypting data on the computer, and the files to display the ransom notes, etc. It carries within itself a password-protected ZIP in .resource section, as mentioned earlier. Interestingly, the password for the ZIP is plain text and not encrypted.

Upon further research we found that even though the password is in plain text, the password keeps changing. Sample 4da1f312a214c07143abeeafb695d904 uses the password “wcry@123”.

Unzipping the password-protected ZIP drops the following files in the desktop directory,

Folder “msg” contains the rtf files with extension .wnry for different languages.

Here are the details of the other files that are unzipped:

1. b.wnry – BMP image file (desktop background mentioning the decryptor tool @WanaDecryptor@.exe to receive ransom payment)

2. c.wnry – contains Tor browser download link

3. r.wnry – Text Message

4. s.wnry – ZIP file with has tor.exe along with its dependent DLLs

5. t.wnry – Encrypted data which then decrypts itself in memory (it’s a DLL file)

6. u.wnry

7. taskdl.exe

8. taskse.exe

It also unzips a batch file that writes a VBScript file m.vbs, that points to an LNK file to run “@WanaDecryptor@.exe” a shown below,

This @WanaDecryptor@.exe, once run, calls taskdl.exe and displays the below screen to the user,

It also copies itself to other locations like

C:\ProgramData\<randomfolder>\@WanaDecryptor@.exe

The following file extensions are susceptible to encryption:

.der, .pfx, .key, .crt, .csr, .p12, .pem, .odt, .ott, .sxw, .stw, .uot, .3ds, .max, .3dm, .ods, .ots, .sxc, .stc, .dif, .slk, .wb2, .odp, .otp, .sxd, .std, .uop, .odg, .otg, .sxm, .mml, .lay, .lay6, .asc, .sqlite3, .sqlitedb, .sql, .accdb, .mdb, .dbf, .odb, .frm, .myd, .myi, .ibd, .mdf, .ldf, .sln, .suo, .cpp, .pas, .asm, .cmd, .bat, .ps1, .vbs, .dip, .dch, .sch, .brd, .jsp, .php, .asp, .java, .jar, .class, .mp3, .wav, .swf, .fla, .wmv, .mpg, .vob, .mpeg, .asf, .avi, .mov, .mp4, .3gp, .mkv, .3g2, .flv, .wma, .mid, .m3u, .m4u, .djvu, .svg, .psd, .nef, .tiff, .tif, .cgm, .raw, .gif, .png, .bmp, .jpg, .jpeg, .vcd, .iso, .backup, .zip, .rar, .tgz, .tar, .bak, .tbk, .bz2, .PAQ, .ARC, .aes, .gpg, .vmx, .vmdk, .vdi, .sldm, .sldx, .sti, .sxi, .602, .hwp, .snt, .onetoc2, .dwg, .pdf, .wk1, .wks, .123, .rtf, .csv, .txt, .vsdx, .vsd, .edb, .eml, .msg, .ost, .pst, .potm, .potx, .ppam, .ppsx, .ppsm, .pps, .pot, .pptm, .pptx, .ppt, .xltm, .xltx, .xlc, .xlm, .xlt, .xlw, .xlsb, .xlsm, .xlsx, .xls, .dotx, .dotm, .dot, .docm, .docb, .docx, .doc

Encrypted files would have extension .wncry  appended to the user file name, e.g. if the file name is user_pic.jpg, after encryption it would be user_pic.jpg.wncry.  The bytes of encrypted file at offset zero would be ‘0×57 0×41 0x4E 0×41 0×43 0×52 0×59 0×21’ (ASCII “WANACRY!”)

In all the folder locations in which encryption occurs there also two additional files dropped:
@WanaDecryptor@.exe.lnk which points to @WanaDecryptor@.exe and @Please_Read_Me@.txt, which contains the ransom note.

As with all ransomware, and to guard against data loss in general, it is important to maintain regular backups of critical data to be able to retrieve it in the case of file or disk corruption.

What is in store for the world now with respect to WannaCry? Are we going to see a different infection strategy, will the binaries be custom-packed, will strings be encrypted? Or will the attack lie low for a while? We’ll be monitoring the twists and turns in the WannaCry saga over time, and will publish new information as and when required.

K7 Threat Control Lab

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April 6th, 2017

We at K7 Threat Control Lab recently encountered an incident reiterating the power of social engineering to trick smartphone users to install bad stuff.

The picture above is self-explanatory. It is clearly a fake message, but it is more convincing since it displays the device make and the current WiFi SSID of the victim, and even uses Google colours and identifiers.

This scareware message attempts to coerce the user to “download the latest Antivirus App”. It is likely from the message “0 minutes and 00 seconds” that upon clicking on the link “REMOVE VIRUS NOW”  user will be redirected to download some dangerous app either from a third party market or even from Google Play Store. The download was never attempted but the app may well have been a deceptor which would claim to have discovered all manner of issues with the device, the fixing of which would require payment.

This fake message may well be generated from the Mi4i device itself (place of manufacture also plays a role in the device’s integrity) or from the WiFi router to which the device was connected at the time.

These kinds of specially crafted user-specific messages exploit the user’s fear factor to force them to download the app recommended in the message, thus compromising their devices themselves.

To avoid any such unwanted circumstances we recommend the smartphone users to:

  • Carefully analyse the messages or alerts which they receive before taking any action. Ignore irrelevant messages
  • Not install apps recommended by strangers
  • Use a top-rated mobile security product such as K7 Mobile Security to block any infection
  • Regularly update the mobile OS and security application installed to be free from mobile malware

K7 Threat Control Lab

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